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 Lex Sportiva is an autonomous de-territorialised legal system, derived from the 
specific nature of sport. Nevertheless, it is subject to interactions with other legal systems, 
including the EU Law. As these two legal systems are essentially transnational, their 
interaction has a great impact on sport. During the last fifty years, this interaction has 
developed significantly, due to continuous case law, soft law and hard law produced by EU 
institutions about sport-related matters. Therefore, the historical evolution of that interaction 
is assessed, highlighting its three stages and the key cases and norms that marked each of 
them. Subsequently, current issues of the tension between Lex Sportiva and EU Law are 
assessed, based on very recent cases. Following this, it will be possible to identify the trends 
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1 INTRODUCTION: LEX SPORTIVA AND EU LAW 
 
Although there are still debates about its classification as a specific field of law
1
, 
Sports Law has clearly developed in the past decades, mostly as a consequence of sport’s 
growth as an important economic activity worldwide – which currently requires highly 
specialised professionals in order to deal with its specificities. Therefore, Sports Law has been 
consolidated as a unique vertical law subject
2
, once it comprises several different fields of 
(horizontal) law which are applicable to a specific human activity: sport. 
 
Part of Sports Law uniqueness derives from the recognition that “sport is special”. 
This statement is very well approached by Weatherill
3
 and reflects sport’s status as a singular 
activity that consequently requires particular legal treatment. Another key aspect, though, is 
the outstanding legal framework that surrounds Sports Law. 
 
On one side, state law can be a key factor. Depending on one nation’s policy about 
sport, it can be highly regulated by national legislation, which thus affects sport-related 
activities on a greater level. Nevertheless, whenever the state’s policy on sport is more liberal, 
national legislation does not play a vital role in Sports Law legal framework. While state law 
influence varies from country to country, another fundamental legal system related to Sports 
Law is applicable independently of each state policy: Lex Sportiva. 
 
Lex Sportiva is an expression inspired by lex mercatoria, in the sense that it refers to 
a law that does not emerge from state, but from transnational relations established by private 
parties. The reference to lex mercatoria is just one of the different conceptions that Latty
4
 
mentions to define Lex Sportiva as transnational, but it probably provides the best description 
                                                 
1
 Timothy Davis, ‘What is Sports Law?’ in Robert C. R. Siekmann and Janwillem Soek (eds) Lex Sportiva: What 
is Sports Law? (T.M.C. Asser Press 2012) 
2
 Robert C. R. Siekmann, ‘What is Sports Law? A Reassessment of Content and Terminology’ in Robert C. R. 
Siekmann and Janwillem Soek (eds) Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law? (T.M.C. Asser Press 2012) 366 
3
 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Introduction’ in Stephen Weatherill (ed) European Sports Law: Collected Papers (T.M.C. 
Asser Press 2014) 
4
 Frank Latty, ‘Transnational Sports Law’ in Robert C. R. Siekmann and Janwillem Soek (eds) Lex Sportiva: 




of Lex Sportiva as the legal system which emanates from the sport bodies
5
 to regulate sports 
activities under their management. In this regard the comparison to lex mercatoria is very 
precise considering that those sport bodies are private entities regularly incorporated in 
accordance with the law of the states where they are seeded; in other words, Lex Sportiva 
comprises rules and principles that do not originate from state, but from private legal persons, 





Once Lex Sportiva is briefly defined, the question arises: what is its relation to EU 
Law – a distinct legal system constituted by norms and decisions emanating from EU 
institutions and applicable in all EU member states? Firstly, it can be argued that both are 
essentially transnational, in the sense that the applicability of their rules extrapolates national 
borders. But the core of their relation is well described by the theory of secant circles, which 
indicates that there is an area of intersection between these two legal systems. 
 
It is true that there is also an intersection between Lex Sportiva and national 
legislation in most countries; nonetheless, differently from national legislation, EU Law 
applies to a wide range of nations – which include, specifically regarding sports, some of the 
most reputable players, clubs, leagues and national teams around the world. It means that a 
very significant part of the sport economic activity throughout the world is directly subject to 
EU Law. 
 
Whilst this could be enough to demonstrate the importance of the interaction 
between EU Law and Lex Sportiva, another key factor must be taken into account. While 
national courts’ decisions (as well as decisions issued by national regulatory and 
administrative authorities) usually produce effects only on a national level, the decisions 
issued by EU institutions, such as the Commission and the CJEU, have transnational range 
and must be observed in all member states. In this regard, the CJEU is by far the court whose 
                                                 
5
 Non-governmental entities duly incorporated as private legal persons in accordance with the legislation of the 
country in which each of them is seeded. In this thesis, we mostly refer to the IOC and the IFs as the main sports 
bodies regulating sport worldwide. 
6




decisions on sport-related matters are more comprehensive
7
, thus more likely to affect Lex 
Sportiva. 
 
This intersection between EU Law and Lex Sportiva, which has constantly been 
under the scrutiny of EU institutions, is the basis of the present thesis. As conflicts between 
their rules have arisen in the last decades, EU Law have proven to be a key moderator of Lex 
Sportiva; nevertheless, such interaction has evolved during this period, and different 
approaches have been developed by the EU institutions. 
 
Following this introduction, the second chapter will present the historical interaction 
between the EU Law and Lex Sportiva so far, examining how it evolved in different stages 
and assessing the decisions and documents that mark each of them. In the third chapter, the 
most recent points of tension between both legal systems will be examined. Finally, based on 
the assessment of those past and current issues, we intend to identify the trends of future 
evolution in the interactions between EU Law and Lex Sportiva. 
 
2 THE HISTORICAL TENSION BETWEEN EU LAW AND LEX SPORTIVA 
 
Even though sport is an ancient activity, its characteristics have changed a lot 
especially during the last century. While amateurship dominated the beginning of 20
th
 
century, nowadays the vast majority of high level athletes are professionals. The Olympic 
Games’ eligibility rules illustrate this evolution: only amateurs were eligible to participate in 





This progress clearly affected the interaction between EU Law and Lex Sportiva. 
Although their connection is much more recent (as the “continental community” roots date 
                                                 
7
 Some international courts’ decisions might be even more comprehensive as their jurisdictions are not limited to 
EU member states. However, the amount of sports-related cases under their appreciation is not significant, which 
prevent them to generate the same impact the CJEU does on sports normativity. 
8




back to the late 1940’s
9
) if compared to the history of sport, this period has been remarkable 
in terms of consolidation of professionalism and exponential progress of sport as an important 
economic activity, mainly in the last fifty years. 
 
As a consequence, different challenges regarding sport have been presented to EU 
institutions during this period, with several key decisions and norms generating indisputable 
effects on Lex Sportiva. Just as sport itself, the level of interaction between these legal 
systems has also developed in the last half century – based on the evolution of EU 
jurisprudence, soft law
10
 and hard law
11




 Stage: The Bosman Era 
 
 The first interactions between EU Law and sport date back to the 1970s. At that time, 
sport had never been mentioned by the TFEU, nor been subject of any Commission document 
yet. Despite that, in 1974 the CJEU
12
 issued its first decision
13
 on a sport-related matter. 
 
 Two cycling athletes filed a claim before a Dutch Court against a rule that had just 
been changed by the UCI, and which had basically created nationality restriction for cyclers to 
compete internationally as a team. The athletes argued that the new rule was against the EU 
Treaty, so the case was referred to the CJEU to decide mainly (i) if the EU Law was 
applicable to sport activities and (ii) if the Treaty’s provisions related to freedom of 
movement of workers were applicable to sport activities. 
 
 The CJEU’s decision established a new paradigm: the Court considered EU Law to be 
generally applicable to sport “in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within the 
                                                 
9
 <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1945-1959_en> accessed 5 June 2018 
10
 Non-binding instruments and norms, which are though generally observed as a legal guidance. 
11
 Binding rules, such as the ones provided by the TFEU. 
12
 At that time, the CJEU was called as European Court of Justice. Nevertheless, for simplification purposes, all 
references on this document are made to CJEU, based on the nomenclature currently established by the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
13
 Case 36/74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale, Koninklijke 




meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty”
14
; on the other side, it stated that a rule that is “of purely 
sporting activity and as such has nothing to do with economic activity”
15
 is not subject to the 
Treaty provisions. The concept that sport, as an economic activity, was subject to EU Law 
was further confirmed on the following sport-related cases judged by the CJEU – Doná v. 
Mantero (1976)
16




 These first CJEU decisions set the tone of that stage: the clear definition that EU Law 
could only override Lex Sportiva
18
 whenever an economic activity was affected by the rule at 
stake; therefore, purely sporting rules were considered to be out of EU Law’s scope. This 
approach probably derived from the absolute lack of EU norms with express reference to 
sport – an omission that may be explained by the fact that sport was still beginning to develop 
its economic potential, and was then considered to be merely a secondary, amateur and 
recreational activity. 
 
 This is probably one of the most remarkable aspects of the interaction established 
between EU Law and Lex Sportiva during this its first stage of evolution: no soft law or hard 
law was needed for the CJEU to decide upon sport-related matters and recognise the general 
validity of rules issued by sport organisations – stating that only those related to economic 
activities were subject to possible limitations. That jurisprudence thus ratified the sport 
organisations’ autonomy to issue rules and manage sports, confirmed Sports Law’s horizontal 
nature and indirectly consolidated Lex Sportiva as a specific, independent, valid and efficient 
legal system. 
 
 Despite their importance, the aforementioned cases did not have a great impact on 
sports normativity, in the sense they did not lead to any major changes to the rules issued by 
                                                 
14
 B.N.O. Walrave (n 13), para 4 
15
 B.N.O. Walrave (n 13), para 8 
16
 Case 13/76 Gaetano Donà v Mario Mantero [1976] ECR 1333 
17
 Case 222/86 Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du football (Unectef) v 
Georges Heylens and others [1987] ECR 4097 
18
 Is must be noticed that there was no reference to the expression Lex Sportiva yet during that 1
st
 stage, as all 
mentions were purely to rules adopted by sporting organisations. It reflects the fact that Sports Law had not 
reached a high level of development at that time, and consequentially Lex Sportiva had not established itself 
academically as a specific legal system. Nevertheless, it is evident that the mentions made then by the CJEU to 









 At that time, football regulations comprised mechanisms through which a player often 
depended on the club’s agreement in order to be transferred to other club, even if the contract 
between them had already expired
20
.  Moreover, most of the national football federations 
based in Europe used to follow UEFA’s rules and limit the participation of non-national 
players; they usually applied the 3 + 2 rule, by which “clubs could play not more than three 
non-nationals in the team and two ‘assimilated’ players who have played in the country in 




That is the summarized background of the claim filed by the Belgian football player 
Jean-Marc Bosman before the Liège Court, in 1990. After a sequence of decisions by the 
Belgian Court
22
, in 1993 the case was finally brought to the CJEU to decide if the federations’ 
rules which (i) disabled a player whose contract is expired to transfer without the club’s 
consent and (ii) limited the participation of non-national players were both in accordance with 
the EU Law. The Court then stated: 
 
114. (…) Article 48 of the Treaty precludes the application of the rules laid 
down by sporting associations, under which a professional footballer who is a 
national of one Member State may not, on the expiry of his contract with a club, 
be employed by a club of another Member State unless the latter club has paid 
to the former club a transfer, training or development fee. 
(…) 
137. (…) Article 48 of the Treaty precludes the application of the rules laid 
down by sporting associations under which, in matches in competitions which 
                                                 
19
 Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club 
liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v 
Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 
20
 Actually, the Belgian Football Association had a “compulsory transfer” rule, which enabled players to be 
transferred without their clubs consenting in case the contract expired, since another club agreed to pay a fixed 
transfer price which was calculated on the basis of the player’s last wage. However, in practical terms, that fixed 
price was often excessive, which meant that the player was unable to get the transfer and was therefore forced to 
stay with the previous club – event if not playing and not receiving wages due to the expiry of the contract. 
21
 Richard Parrish, Sports Law and Policy in the European Union (Manchester University Press 2003) 92 
22




they organize, football clubs may field only a limited number of professional 




 The decision could not be clearer: sport bodies (and consequently Lex Sportiva) are 
subject to EU Law, in an evident sign of the permanent interaction between both legal 
systems. The nationality clause and the attachment of a player to a club after the contract 
expiry, as then regulated by national football federations and UEFA, were thus considered to 
be against EU Law – mainly under the non-discrimination and freedom of movement 
principles. As Weatherill
24
 argued, that decision was vital for recognition of sport’s special 
nature and concurrently to define that its autonomy is not unlimited, as Lex Sportiva is subject 
to interactions with external legal systems. 
 
 Differently from the previous CJEU’s decisions, the effects of Bosman ruling were not 
limited to the claimant. Following it, FIFA implemented substantial changes on its transfer 
system, enabling players to freely transfer between clubs whenever their employment 
contracts expire. Moreover, UEFA and the national federations abolished the non-national 
player limits regarding nationals of EU member states. 
 
 Those were the first – and probably the most important so far – signs of EU Law effect 
on sports normativity. By stating that those rules related to an economic activity and were 
inadequate to EU fundamental freedoms, the CJEU decision led to changes in Lex Sportiva, as 
FIFA, UEFA and European national federations were compelled to amend their rules so as to 
adapt them to EU Law. 
 
 The sport bodies’ attitude is justified by the fact that EU member states comprise some 
of the most important athletes, clubs, leagues and national teams, especially concerning 
football. Therefore, the maintenance of rules which were notoriously contrary to EU Law 
meant that they could be subsequently challenged before the CJEU several times. 
                                                 
23
 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL (n 19), paras 114 and 137 
24
 Stephen Weatherill, ‘The Lex Sportiva and EU Law: The Academic Lawyer’s Path Before and After Bosman’ 
in Antoine Duval and Ben Van Rompuy (eds), The Legacy of Bosman: Revisiting the Relationship between EU 




Furthermore, there was a significant political aspect involved in this matter; in this regard, 
Duval points out the complex law-making process that involved EU institutions and FIFA in 
both legal and political fields, and resulted in changes to the RSTP, with CJEU ruling on 
Bosman case proving to be an “instrumental” part of it: 
 
(…) the Bosman ruling was instrumental in providing the impetus for the 
negotiation of the current transfer system. The ruling offered a window of 
opportunity to launch a complex transnational law-making process involving a 
multiplicity of actors. This process, triggered by the European Commission, took 
place in the shadow of EU competition law and was concluded with a seemingly 
soft agreement that paved the way to the introduction of the FIFA RSTP as we 
know it. Arguably, it constitutes a remarkable example of the complexity and 
entanglement of the new transnational public/private law-making processes at play 




 This statement ratifies another main aspect of the interaction between EU Law and Lex 
Sportiva: the range of EU institutions’ decisions. As they may cause transnational effects to 
entities and individuals in all EU member states, their impact is much wider and may 
potentially affect great part of the most significant stakeholders in sport. Except for the United 
States
26
, it is not an exaggeration to state that Europe is the center of professional sports 
worldwide. This is confirmed by the fact that most of the IFs recognized by the IOC (and the 
IOC itself) are headquartered in the continent. 
 
 Therefore, the first stage of interaction concerning EU Law and Lex Sportiva was 
marked by the absence of soft law and hard law, as well as by the first sport-related cases 
decided by the CJEU. The Court then established that the verification of economic activity 
was the key for EU Law to impact Lex Sportiva, and the effects of Bosman ruling constituted 




 Stage: Meca-Medina and The White Paper on Sport 
 
                                                 
25
 Antoine Duval, ‘The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: Transnational Law-Making in 
the Shadow of Bosman’ in Antoine Duval and Ben Van Rompuy (eds), The Legacy of Bosman: Revisiting the 
Relationship between EU Law and Sport (T.M.C. Asser Press 2016) 
26





 The aforementioned scenario stably prevailed until the beginning of the current 
century. Sport organisations seemed comfortable with the jurisprudence developed during the 
first stage, which prevented several of their rules – the so-called “purely sporting” ones – 
from being challenged on the grounds of EU Law breach. However, a new decision issued by 
the CJEU in 2006 reformulated the previous understanding and inaugurated the second stage 
of interaction between Lex Sportiva and EU Law. 
 
 The swimmers David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen were both suspended for 
violating anti-doping rules, after decisions from the FINA’s doping panel and the CAS. The 
athletes then filed a complaint before the Commission, challenging the anti-doping rules in 
question and arguing that they infringed “the athletes’ economic freedoms” and rules of 
Competition Law. The complaint was unsuccessful though. 
 
 The athletes then filed a claim before the European Court of First Instance, which 
dismissed the case. As they appealed, the case was finally brought to the CJEU. Despite 
having also dismissed the case, the decision took into consideration a new interpretation about 
sporting rules subject to EU Law, detaching them from the purely economic perspective that 
had previously been taken as fundamental: 
 
In light of all these considerations, it is apparent that the mere fact that a rule 
is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the 
scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule 
or the body which has laid it down. 
(…) 
Therefore, even if those rules do not constitute restrictions on freedom of 
movement because they concern questions of purely sporting interest and, as 
such, have nothing to do with economic activity (Walrave and Koch and 
Doná), that fact means neither that the sporting activity in question 
necessarily falls outside the scope of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC nor that the 




 The new solution adopted by the CJEU was fundamentally based on the premise that 
even the “purely sporting” rules were subject to EU Law in principle. Therefore, whenever 
                                                 
27
 Case C-519/04 P David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities [2006] 




contested, they must be examined so as to verify if they are in accordance with EU Law; if 
they are not, the court will assess if their existence is justified, necessary and adequate to 
achieve broader objectives in the benefit of sport. Weatherill described that reasoning: 
 
(…) the overall context in which sports regulation occurs, built around pursuit of a 
broad objective of fair competition, produces effects which though apparently 
restrictive of competitions are nonetheless inherent in the pursuit of those 
objectives and therefore permitted. It is this route that is chosen by the CJEU in 
Meca-Medina. Anti-doping rules cannot simply be excluded from the scope of 
review by reference to their role in ensuring “fair play”. They must be examined in 
their proper context, including recognition of their economic effect. But placing the 
rules within the ambit of the Treaty does not mean they will be forbidden by it. The 
general objective of the rules was to combat doping in order for competitive sport 
to be conducted on a fair basis; and the effect of penalties on athletes’ freedom of 
action is inherent in the anti-doping rules. This contextual examination of the rules 
was crucial in the Court’s conclusion that rules affected the athletes’ freedom of 





 In practical terms, the new ruling moved away the idea that great part of Lex Sportiva 
– the so-called “purely sporting rules” – was not at EU Law’s range. The intersection area 
between both systems thus grew significantly, as any sport rule became subject to assessment 
under EU Law. 
 
 From the sports bodies’ perspective, such movement represented a potential impact on 
the stability of their regulations. Mestre
29
 emphasised the risk it created to sports legal 
certainty, arguing its inadequacy to sports autonomy and specificity. Indeed, sport was still 
considered as special, but its specificity was not enough to prevent EU institutions from 
interfering on any of their rules whenever understood as contrary to EU Law. In this regard, 
Infantino (currently FIFA’s president, but then acting as UEFA’s director of legal affairs) 
expressed the sports bodies’ concern: 
 
                                                 
28
 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina [2006] ECR I-6991’ in Jack Anderson (ed) Leading 
Cases in Sports Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2013) 
29
 Alexandre Miguel Mestre, ‘Bosman – 20 anos depois. E agora?’ (15 December 2015) 
<http://www.sabado.pt/opiniao/convidados/alexandre_mestre/detalhe/bosman___20_anos_depois_e_agora.html




(…) it is not difficult to see how the position adopted by the Court may still open 
up a "Pandora's box" of potential legal problems. For a start, almost any sports 
disciplinary measure for any offence (e.g. doping, match-fixing, gambling, bad 
conduct, etc) might be described as representing a condition "for engaging in" 
sporting activity (in the sense that such measures may restrict somebody from 
"working"). Thus, all disciplinary measures (especially those imposing significant 
penalties) could, it seems, now be susceptible to challenge under EU competition 
law. It may also be assumed that the view taken by the Court applies to the position 
of clubs as well as players. There are a myriad of sports rules and regulations 
concerning the eligibility of clubs to participate ("engage in") sporting competition. 
Should all of them be subject to review under EU law? The judgment of the ECJ 
seems to indicate that the answer is yes, even though it seems difficult to imagine 




 Despite criticism, Meca-Medina decision proved to be of great importance for the 
evolution of interaction between EU Law and Lex Sportiva, playing a key role on its second 
stage. Besides innovating on the application of EU Law to sports normativity, the CJEU’s 
ruling also served as basis
31
 for part of the most important sport-related document produced 




 Differently from the CJEU, the EU Commission has not always been so much 
effective regarding sport issues
33
. However, it can’t be said that it has been unconcerned about 
the subject. For example, even before Bosman ruling, it negotiated with UEFA in order to 
remove – or at least minimize – the non-national restrictions on European and national 
competitions. The parties reached a (non-binding) agreement, but UEFA failed to fully 




                                                 
30
 Gianni Infantino, ‘Meca-Medina: a step backwards for the European Sports Model and the Specificity of 
Sport?’ (2 October 2006) 
 <https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/KeyTopics/480391_DOWNLOAD.pdf> accessed 20 
July 2018 
31
 Weatherill (n 28) 144-146 
32
 White Paper on Sport [2007] <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0391&from=EN> accessed 20 July 2018 
33
 This statement refers specifically to the Commission’s more passive attitude related to the issuance of 
decisions involving sports-related matters. We do not disregard the Commission’s importance on the political 
arrangements established with sports organisations which contributed to the interaction between EU law and Lex 
Sportiva. 
34
 Steven Stewart, ‘The Development of sports law in the European Union, its globalisation, and the competition 




 So it can be said that the Commission has been involved in sport matters since the 
abovementioned 1
st
 stage, even though on a different perspective if compared to CJEU. The 
Commission was more concerned about sport’s specificities and its potential contribution to 
other European policies, instead of enforcing direct application of the Treaty. It led to a 
number of initiatives
35
, such as: (i) creation of European Sport Forum, in 1991; (ii) 
Declaration on sport annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty
36
, in 1997; (iii) issuance of the 
Commission staff working paper “The Development and Prospects for Community Action in 
the Field of Sport”
37
, in 1998; and (iv) Helsinki report on sport
38
, in 1999. 
 
 The Commission then became more active on dealing with sport issues when they 
were related to specific EU competences, and situations involving Competition Law turned to 
be the most evident example of that attitude – which was later ratified by the ISU case, as 
assessed in Chapter 3. Several decisions have been issued on media rights, ticket sales 
arrangements, sport goods, state aids and even on organisational matters. 
 
 Nevertheless, only in 2007 the Commission issued the White Paper on Sport, its most 
important and comprehensive document regarding sport. The paper itself recognised that the 
initiative “marks the first time that the Commission is addressing sport-related issues in a 
comprehensive manner”
39
 and defined its objective: 
 
Its overall objective is to give strategic orientation on the role of sport in Europe, to 
encourage debate on specific problems, to enhance the visibility of sport in EU 
policy-making and to raise public awareness of the needs and specificities of the 
sector.
40 
                                                 
35
 Joana Freire Pais de Almeida, ‘Desporto e União Europeia. A venda colectiva dos direitos de transmissão 
televisiva de eventos desportivos e a concorrência. O mercado português: a televisão e o futebol.’ [2013] 
Maio/Agosto Desporto & Direito – Revista Jurídica do Desporto 249, 256-258 
36
 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts - Declarations adopted by the Conference - Declaration on sport  [1997] OJ 
C 340/136 
37
 The development and prospects for Community  action in the field of sport [1998] 
<http://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/sport/library/documents/doc252_en.pdf > accessed 20 July 2018 
38
 Report from the Commission to the European Council with a view to safeguarding current sports structures 
and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework: The Helsinki Report on Sport 
[1999] <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1999:0644:FIN:EN:PDF > accessed 20 
July 2018 
39
 White Paper on Sport (n 32) 2 
40





 The Commission then provided several proposals and guidelines on sports, 
approaching it through three different perspectives: (i) the societal role of sport, (ii) the 
economic dimension of sport, and (iii) the organization of sport. 
 
 The inclusion of the societal role of sport represented an important innovation, as the 
Commission finally expanded from sport’s economic and organisational dimensions, which 
had been highly predominant until then, and recognized its multiple social roles: “in addition 
to improving the health of European citizens, sport has an educational dimension and plays a 
social, cultural and recreational role”
41
. In this regard, several social aspects were 
contemplated by the paper, such as (i) the development of physical activity to enhance public 
health, (ii) the fight against doping, (iii) the relation between sport and education (and 
training), (iv) the utility of sport for social inclusion, (v) the fight against racism and violence 
and (vi) sustainable development. 
 
 As far as the economic dimension of sport was concerned, the White Paper on Sport 
did not innovate, recognising sport as “a dynamic and fast-growing sector with an 
underestimated macro-economic impact, (…) [which] can contribute to the Lisbon objectives 




 Regarding organisation of sport, the Commission expressed its concern about the 
development of good governance and prevention of corruption, among many other significant 
subjects that are intrinsically related to sport organisations autonomy. More importantly, the 
White Paper on Sport endorsed the CJEU’s decision on Meca-Medina and reinforced that the 
analysis of sporting rules must be done on a case-by-case basis so as to verify if they comply 
with EU Law, hence underlining the impossibility to formulate “general guidelines on the 
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 The White Paper on Sport thus played a significant role in the relationship between 
Lex Sportiva and EU Law; as Siekmann
44
 stated, it was the first document issued by the 
Commission which provided assistance on the meaning of specificity of sport – mostly 
grounded on Meca-Medina decision. Such specificity is revealed by the White Paper in two 
aspects: (i) specificity of sporting activities and of sporting rules, and (ii) specificity of the 
sport structure. Both are fundamental to Lex Sportiva, with the latter proving to be vital so as 
to ensure sports organisations’ autonomy. 
 
 Furthermore, the White Paper on Sport can also be interpreted as an express 
recognition of Lex Sportiva existence by the Commission, as it exemplifies specific sporting 
rules which are not subject to EU Law in principle: 
 
Examples of such rules would be “rules of the game” (e.g. rules fixing the length of 
matches or the number of players on the field), rules concerning selection criteria 
for sport competitions, “at home and away from home” rules, rules preventing 
multiple ownership in club competitions, rules concerning the composition of 






 stage was thus marked by an apparent paradox: whilst the specificity of sport 
was largely recognised and ratified, a different way of dealing with it was provided, 
expanding the possibility of EU intervention on sporting rules. The test created by the CJEU 
on Meca-Medina and later endorsed by the White Paper on Sport raised concerns among sport 
organisations
46
, with complaints about legal uncertainty. Moreover, it can also be argued that 
this 2
nd
 stage had a great impact on sport bodies’ autonomy, as their organisation (and Lex 
Sportiva as a whole) became more easily subject to assessment by EU institutions. 
 
 Nevertheless, those limitations to sport organisations’ autonomy are a natural 
consequence of the interaction between EU Law and Lex Sportiva. In other words, their 
autonomy has never been meant to be unlimited or untouchable, and has always been subject 
to external interference whenever Lex Sportiva norms affected rules emanating from other 
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legal system. In this regard, the 2
nd
 stage “simply” provided a different solution to handle with 
that interaction – while effectively expanding in practice the intersection area between EU 




 Stage: Lisbon Treaty and Olivier Bernard 
 
 It is interesting to notice that the interaction between EU Law and Lex Sportiva 




 stages) despite sport not being 
contemplated in the TFEU. It means that both the CJEU and the Commission so far based 
their decisions exclusively on non-sporting grounds (in other words: grounded on EU rules 
which were not directly destined to sport, but were applicable due to the horizontal nature of 
Sports Law – i.e. Competition Law, Intellectual Property Law, Labour Law…) and on EU 
soft law which provided some guidance on sport aspects. 
 
 One of the paramount soft law sources in this regard was the so-called Nice 
Declaration
47
: the Declaration on “the specific characteristics of sport and its social function 
in Europe, of which account should be taken in implementing common policies”. This 
Declaration, issued in 2000 (still during the 1st stage of evolution) by the European Council, 
stated that “even though not having any direct powers in this area, the Community must, in its 
action under the various Treaty provisions, take account of the social, educational and cultural 
functions inherent in sport and making it special”. It thus constituted an important source of 
soft law, as it expressly recognised the specificity of sport and the “support for the 
independence of sports organisations and their right to organise themselves through 
appropriate associative structures” – which would be later ratified by the White Paper on 
Sport. 
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 After unsuccessful previous attempts of incorporating sport to EU’s legal 
framework
48
, it finally happened through the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, since December 1, 
2009 (when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force), the TFEU has been providing specific 
regulation on sport in its Article 165. Interestingly, the article comprises education, youth and 
sport together, which clearly points to one of the fundamental virtues of sport: its societal 
aspect, which had already been highlighted by the White Paper on Sport. Nonetheless, the 
TFEU provisions are not restricted to that facet; in fact, they also present interesting guidance 
on the economic dimension and on the organisation of sport, following the categories 




 described the inclusion of sport in the Treaty as “an attempt to make 
clearer the relationship between the EU and sport”. In this regard, he argued that Article 165 
created a merely supporting competence for the EU (indicating that it did not assume a central 
role on sports regulation) but simultaneously provided legitimacy for the EU institutions to 
act in sport-related matters. 
 
 Despite representing an important mark on Sports Law – which was finally lifted to 
hard law status in the EU –, the Treaty did not create any new paradigm on the interaction 
between EU Law and Lex Sportiva, basically following the White Paper logic. Furthermore, 
Siekmann reminded that Treaty provisions about sport “‘codified’ in fact the philosophy and 
phraseology of the Sport Declarations of Nice and Amsterdam, referring to the social and 




  Still, it is vital to notice that Article 165(1) expressly ratifies the specific nature of 
sport: “The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking 
account of the specific nature of sport (…)”. This can be understood as an endorsement of the 
path taken by the CJEU so far, which basically lied on specificity of sport as the fundamental 





                                                 
48
  Richard Parrish, Borja García García, Samuli Miettinen and Robert Siekmann, The Lisbon Treaty and EU 
Sports Policy (European Parliament 2010) 15 
49
 Stephen Weatherill, ‘EU Sports Law: The Effect of the Lisbon Treaty’ in Stephen Weatherill (ed) European 
Sports Law: Collected Papers (T.M.C. Asser Press 2014) 519 
50




Therefore, the legitimacy mentioned by Weatherill is not only related to future cases, but also 
conferred to the previous jurisprudence consolidated by the CJEU. 
 
 It is not by coincidence that Article 165 is expressly mentioned by the CJEU in 
Bernard
51
, one of the most recent Sports Law landmark cases. That was the first time
52
 the 
CJEU could rely on the Treaty to assess the specificity of sport – or even the “specificity of 
(professional) football”, as argued by Mestre
53
 – and use it as the basis for a decision. 
Moreover, the ruling went beyond specificity and was grounded on the social role of sport, as 
Pijetlovic stated: 
 
(…) the Court accepted the objective of encouraging recruitment and training of 
young players as legitimate. The social importance of sport played a crucial role in 
legitimating this objective and it would probably not be accepted as such in (m)any 
other employment sectors. Unlike in Bosman, the compensations fees in Bernard 
were deemed capable of attaining the said objective. Thereafter, the Court referred 
for the first time to Article 165(1) TFEU; it set out the standard of application of 
the proportionality principle in the objective justification framework, according to 
which account must be taken of the specific characteristics of sport and its social 
and educational function. The same standard of application of proportionality test, 





 The Bernard case thus revealed the essence of 3
rd
 stage of interaction between EU Law 
and Lex Sportiva, already influenced by the introduction of sport in the TFEU. The rule 
adequacy to EU Law is not mandatory for it to be considered as valid by the Court; even if it 
does not fit entirely into EU Law (in Bernard, the fundamental freedom of movement of 
workers was at stake, and the Court initially indicated that the training compensation 
restricted it), it can be considered as valid as long as it pursues a legitimate objective and is 
necessary and proportionate to achieve such objective. Therefore, it follows the Meca-Medina 
ruling – but now based on a Treaty provision. 
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 This is exactly where EU Law and Lex Sportiva stand in the present. The development 
of their interaction brought different solutions for the unavoidable tensions during the last 
decades, but consistently preserved specificity of sport as the fundamental characteristic to be 
observed.  
 
3 CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
 
 The different stages presented in Chapter 2 show that the interaction between EU Law 
and Lex Sportiva has been continuous, as new sources of soft law and hard law have evolved, 
and mainly the CJEU has developed new interpretations to settle the conflicts presented to it. 
In this regard, it is interesting to notice that such interaction seems to be more intense as long 
as sport solidifies as an important economic activity. For example, European football market 
revenue in 2016/2017 season exceeded €25 billlion
55
 – an amount that surpasses the GDP of 
almost 100 nations
56
. Although most of the other sports have not reached such economic 
magnitude yet, all of them have pointed to professionalism direction, so that the potential 
conflicts between their rules and the EU Law have been growing too. 
 
 As a consequence, new points of tension between EU Law and Lex Sportiva  have 
been continuously arising, and the evolution is ongoing. Despite apparently living the third 
stage of such development, we have recently seen signs of a possible change of paradigm, 
which can potentially lead to a brand new fourth stage. These signs derive from a diversity of 
new cases which have been presented before EU institutions – or that have not even been 
presented yet, but already demonstrated their potential to impact Lex Sportiva. 
 
 Three different important cases will be studied: the first one is specifically related to 
football, presenting some similarities with Bosman; the second one comprises a case 
regarding skating, but with potential impact on every single sport discipline; and the third one 
is probably the most comprehensive in terms of sports organisation. Hence very diverse 
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issues, with different possible consequences, but a fundamental similarity: the potential to 
make a strong impact on Lex Sportiva. 
 
 But before analysing them, it is vital to assess a case that has already been established 
as a landmark in state recognition of Lex Sportiva validity and CAS’s competence – which are 
intimately related to each other. 
 
3.1 The Pechstein Case 
 
 Throughout this thesis, we have been dealing with the dialogue between two 
transnational legal systems: EU Law and Lex Sportiva. Nevertheless, this is not the only 
interaction that each of them faces regarding different systems; both have continuous contact 
with national legal systems, generally constituted by positive law
57
 emanating from the state 
and enforced by national courts. The Pechstein case is a recent and remarkable example of 
such interaction: it refers to sporting rules, which were questioned before national courts 
though. 
 
 It started in 2009, when the German speed skater Claudia Pechstein was sanctioned by 
the ISU for anti-doping violation, thus becoming ineligible to compete for two years. As a 
consequence, the athlete and the German national federation
58
 appealed to CAS against the 
ISU Disciplinary Committee decision; however, in 2010 the arbitral panel dismissed both 
appellations, hence upholding the ineligibility sanction. Subsequently, Pechstein appealed 
before the Swiss Federal Tribunal, aiming the annulment of CAS award – but her request was 
rejected once again. 
 
 Therefore, at that time (September 2010) the regular jurisdictional instances provided 
by Lex Sportiva
59
 were exhausted. Despite that, the athlete was still unsatisfied about the 
sanctions imposed to her, and then brought the case to German courts. The claim filed before 
the Regional Court of Munich comprised requests for “a declaratory judgement stating that 
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her ban due to doping was unlawful, and a decision ordering the Defendants to pay 





 At that lawsuit, the subject matter was not just the anti-doping violation anymore, but 
mainly the validity of the arbitration agreement which led the case to be ruled by CAS. This is 
precisely the fact that underlines the importance of the case: besides putting at stake the 
arbitration agreement which was applicable in a concrete situation involving the two parties 
(Pechstein and ISU), the lawsuit examined CAS’s competence in a broader sense, as it 
frequently derives from similar agreements. 
 
 The significance of such discussion for Lex Sportiva is immeasurable, as CAS is 
fundamental for its stability as an autonomous legal system: the arbitral awards frequently 
represent a source of law, supporting the development, interpretation and consolidation of 
sporting rules
61
; and CAS plays a key institutional role which ensures enforceability of those 
rules within the system. In other words, CAS tops a jurisdictional system built within Lex 
Sportiva, which is duly capable of enforcing sanctions of sporting nature. This whole 
jurisdictional system (and Lex Sportiva itself) could thus be undermined if CAS’s competence 
was rejected. 
 
 That possibility temporarily became reality during Pechstein case. In 2015, the Higher 
Regional Court of Munich issued a decision that considered the arbitration agreement entered 
into by the athletes as invalid and, moreover, stated that CAS did not constitute a proper 
arbitral tribunal. The invalidity of such agreement was held on the grounds that “the fact that 
ISU required from Pechstein to sign an arbitration agreement in favour of CAS is an abuse of 
dominant position”
62
; regarding CAS, the Tribunal stated that it comprised an unjustified 
imbalance in favour of sports organisations due to the mechanism provided to nominate and 
select arbitrators, which compromised its neutrality and independence. 
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 Despite denying that the arbitration agreement was invalid per se as a consequence of 
the athlete lacking free will, the decision eventually echoed some of the criticism directed by 
a few experts, such as Foster, to CAS’s current structure: 
 
Arbitration systems ultimately get their legitimacy from the contractual agreement 
of the parties. When the issues before the Court of Arbitration for Sport are appeals 
against the exercise of disciplinary power over athletes, who are forced to agree to 
its jurisdiction, then a contractual model is inoperative. 
Mandatory arbitration has many dangers. The power differential between athletes 
and the federations is obvious. The procedure for choosing arbitrators remains 
opaque. There are specialised counsels, who are themselves often past arbitrators, 
and as such have an advantage when they represent federations. Awards are still 





 But that ruling did not resist to the appeal filed by the ISU before German Supreme 
Court. This Court’s decision, issued in June 2016, set the Regional Court decision aside, 
confirming the legitimacy of the arbitration agreement, validating CAS as a proper 
independent and neutral arbitral tribunal, and expressly ratifying its importance: 
 
The request for an arbitration agreement designating the CAS as the Court of 
arbitration is definitely justified from an objective point of view and does not 
contradict the general values enshrined in the law. In particular, this request is in no 
way contrary to the Plaintiff’s right of access to the courts, her rights of 
professional freedom (Art. 12 of the German Constitution) and her rights under 
Art. 6 ECHR. This also means that the arbitration agreement cannot be considered 
invalid pursuant to sec. 138 of the German Civil Code. 
(…) 
Only an independent and fair sports arbitration can expect to be recognised and 
respected worldwide, and every athlete wishing to participate in fair competition 
must be interested in having alleged violations of anti-doping rules cleared up and 
sanctioned on an international level in accordance with uniform standards, and in 
ensuring equal treatment for all the athletes from different countries against whom 
such violations may have been alleged. 
(…) If this task were left to the courts in the individual states, the goal of 
international sporting arbitration would be jeopardised. (…) The statutes of the 
CAS, as they currently stand, contain procedural rules for the appointment of 
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 It is important to notice, though, that the Pechstein saga is not over yet: after another 
appeal, the case was brought to German Constitutional Court
65
; and there is a pending 
complaint before the ECHR
66
 as well. 
 
 Despite that, and even though being called as a “surrealist ruling” by Duval
67
, that 
decision indeed constituted a key endorsement of Lex Sportiva (by indirectly recognising the 
legitimacy of one of its pillars – the jurisdictional system topped by CAS) by the German 
legal system – which is highly reputable and inspiring for many other national legal systems, 
especially in Civil Law countries. Therefore, Pechstein must be duly considered when 
assessing the possible trends of Lex Sportiva’s future interaction with the other legal system 
that pervades this thesis: EU Law. 
 
3.2 TPO Prohibition 
  
 As already mentioned in Chapter 2, after Bosman case FIFA had to deploy deep 
changes to its transfer system. In order to adjust it to EU Law, FIFA designed a new system 
based on two pillars: federative and economic rights. The first has always necessarily referred 
to the labour relationship between the player and the club he is employed by. Nevertheless, 
the latter one did not necessarily refer entirely to the employer club, as FIFA regulations had 




 TPO was very much used by several clubs as a way to sign (or retain) players they 
would not be able to afford if they needed to acquire their economic rights (especially in 
countries such as Brazil
69
, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Belgium, Holland and Turkey
70
). In other 
                                                 
65
 Peter Bert, ‘Sports Law: Update on the Pechstein Case’ (Dispute Resolution in Germany, 31 May 2017) 
<http://www.disputeresolutiongermany.com/2017/05/sports-law-update-on-the-pechstein-case/> accessed 24 
July 2018 
66
 Claudia Pechstein v Switzerland (Case no. 67474/10) 
67
 Antoine Duval, ‘The BGH’s Pechstein Decision: A Surrealist Ruling’ (Asser International Sports Law Blog, 8 
June 2016) <http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/the-bgh-s-pechstein-decision-a-surrealist-ruling> 
accessed 12 July 2018 
68
 As van Maren and Duval explain in Oskar van Maren, Antoine Duval, La Liga, Raffaele Poli, Ariel N. Reck, 
Daniel Geey, Christian Duve and Florian Loibl, ‘Debating FIFA’s TPO ban: ASSER International Sports Law 
Blog symposium’. [2016] Int Sports law J 15: 234, the expression “TPO” is often criticized by some experts, 
who understand that “third-party investment” or “third-party entitlement” would more accurately describe the 
legal situation. Nevertheless, FIFA reasonably justify the reference to TPO on the grounds that the ownership is 
related to the economic rights, not to the player himself. 
69
 Marcos Motta and Pedro Fida, ‘TPO in Brazil: The Implementation of a Ban’ (November 2015) < 




words, it used to be a very important financing mechanism for numerous clubs in a global 
market, as they compete with wealthier clubs form the same league or even from wealthier 
leagues. 
 
 In contrast, TPO used to be criticised as the investors were considered to influence 
clubs’ and players’ decisions regarding transfers – which was alleged to be an undesirable 
interference from third parties on football market. In order to avoid this, in 2007 FIFA 
inserted Article 18bis on its RSTP, preventing clubs from entering “into a contract which 
enables the counter club/counter clubs, and vice versa, or any third party to acquire the ability 
to influence in employment and transfer-related matters its independence, its policies or the 
performance of its teams”. 
 
 Notwithstanding, FIFA apparently found it was insufficient to avoid third-party 
influence on player transfers. Then, in 2015, a new rule was included in FIFA RSTP: Article 
18ter, which expressly banned TPO. From then on, TPO prohibition has been in force – but 
not without intense legal controversy. 
 
 The origin of such dispute resides precisely on the conflict between FIFA RSTP and 
EU fundamental freedoms and Competition Law – which naturally raises comparisons with 
Bosman. In this regard, while addressing Bosman, Siekmann explained why the transfer 
system is so susceptible to the tension between Lex Sportiva and EU Law: 
 
The transfer system of players is an example of the specificity of sport. (…) 
Transfer rules aim to protect the integrity of sporting competition and to avoid 
problems such as money laundering, but they must be in compliance with EU law. 
In its Bosman ruling, the Court of Justice unequivocally stated that ‘nationals of a 
Member State have, in particular, the right, which they derive directly from the 
Treaty, to leave their country of origin, to enter the territory of another Member 
State and reside there in order to pursue an economic activity. Provisions which 
preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in 
order to exercise his right to free movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that 
freedom, even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the workers 
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 The debate about TPO prohibition was brought to practice by the Belgian club RFC 
Seraing before CAS, in a case
72
 that clearly revealed the legal reasoning behind clubs’ and 
FIFA’s positions. After being sanctioned for violating Articles 18bis and 18ter of FIFA 
RSTP, RFC Seraing appealed to CAS and alleged that TPO ban was illegal. It claimed that 
Article 18ter violated EU Competition Law and especially three of the fundamental freedoms 
established by the TFEU: movement of workers, provision of services and movement of 
capital. On the other side, FIFA sustained that TPO prohibition was fully compliant with EU 
Law, and that it aimed five objectives: (i) stability of players’ contracts, (ii) players’ and 
clubs’ autonomy, (iii) transparency, (iv) integrity and equity, and (v) avoidance of conflicts of 
interest. 
 
 The CAS Panel admitted that Article18ter comprised restriction to the aforementioned 
fundamental freedoms, but interestingly applied the Bernard reasoning to state that the 
restriction did not necessarily lead to the illegality of the rule: it could be considered valid 
once it pursued legitimate objectives and was necessary and proportionate to achieve them. 
Therefore, based on these grounds elaborated by the CJEU, the CAS Panel concluded that 
Article 18ter was valid as long as TPO prohibition was adequate and proportional to achieve 
the legitimate objectives argued by FIFA. 
 
 This CAS ruling in principle strengthened FIFA’s position, but it did not represent a 
final and unchanging decision about the validity of TPO prohibition under EU Law (despite 
CAS’s importance for the making of Lex Sportiva, already mentioned in section 3.1). Firstly, 
because of a particular characteristic that is inherent to arbitration: the same controversy can 
be brought to CAS by another club, and a different Panel would not necessarily come to the 
same conclusion reached by that first one. And more importantly, because RFC Seraing case 
is still being discussed before the Brussels Court of Appeal. 
 
 The claim filed by the club before the Belgian court questioned the validity of Article 
18ter among other issues, and was decided in favour of FIFA in first instance. Nevertheless, a 
decision on RFC Seraing’s appeal is still pending, with the club having asked the court to 
refer the case to the CJEU. 
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 If this claim is accepted, it is possible that the CJEU adopts a stricter and more EU 
Law-oriented approach on the matter, which could undermine TPO ban’s validity. Even 
though the Commission already dismissed a complaint lodged against TPO prohibition
73
 and 
expressed its opinion in favour of such ban
74
, a CJEU decision on the subject could easily 
point to another direction – mostly because FIFA’s alleged objectives are questionable, and 





 Therefore, the debate regarding TPO is still pretty much alive
76
 and it will not be 
surprising if the CJEU (once again) have the final word to solve this point of tension between 
Lex Sportiva and EU Law. If so, there will be high expectations regarding the reasoning to be 
adopted by the Court on its decision: Will the CJEU adopt the test established in Bernard and 
replicated by CAS, as expected? If so, will the Court rule the case just as CAS did? Or will it 
come to a different conclusion, either based on the same test or creating a new paradigm? 
 
 The answers are uncertain, and we may never know them if the subject is not brought 
to the CJEU. However, the controversy regarding legality of TPO prohibition before EU Law 
does have potential to become a landmark case in the CJEU, possibly leading to a new 
demand for changes on FIFA RSTP almost thirty years after Bosman ruling did. 
 
3.3 The ISU Case 
 
 As exhaustively mentioned throughout this thesis, the CJEU has evolved as the EU 
institution whose decisions make more impact on Lex Sportiva. Nevertheless, it was the 
Commission who played the key role in examining one of the most important recent cases and 
issuing a decision whose impact can also become comparable to Bosman’s. 
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 In June 2014, two Dutch speed skaters filed a complaint before the Commission 
against ISU’s 2014 eligibility rules; the norm in question provided that any person who skated 
or officiated in an event not sanctioned by the ISU or one of its affiliated members would 
become ineligible to participate in ISU activities and competitions – without any possibility of 
being reinstated as an eligible person. They alleged that those rules were in breach of EU 
Competition Law, as they could not participate in speed skating events organised by non-ISU 
members, and hence lost the opportunity to earn alternative revenues. After three years, in 
December 2017 the Commission issued the following decision: 
 
The International Skating Union has infringed Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area by adopting and enforcing the Eligibility rules, in 
particular Rules 102 and 103 of the ISU 2014 General Regulations and the ISU 
2016 General Regulations, with regard to speed skating. The infringement started 
in June 1998 and is still ongoing. 
(…) 
The International Skating Union shall, within 90 days of the date of notification of 
this Decision, bring to an end the infringement referred to in Article 1 and shall, 
within that period of time, communicate to the Commission all the measures it has 




 This decision thus expressly recognized that the eligibility rules adopted and enforced 
by the ISU consisted on a direct violation to EU Competition Law, and determined the proper 
amendment so as to remedy the infringement. And the reasoning embraced by the 
Commission to come to that conclusion was very interesting. 
 
 Firstly, the case was assessed purely under EU Competition Law perspective. In order 
to do so, the worldwide market for the organisation and commercial exploitation of 
international speed skating events was defined as the relevant market (considering both 
product and geographic aspects), in which the ISU (an association of undertakings) was 
considered to have a strong position; furthermore, the Commission concluded that the 
eligibility rules at stake constituted a decision of an association of undertakings. 
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 With all those premises being settled, the Commission established that the eligibility 
rules restricted competition on the relevant market by object and by effects. Regarding object, 
one important aspect taken into consideration was the content of the rules, which expressed 
that “the condition of eligibility is made for the adequate protection of the economic and other 
interests of the ISU”
78
; on this ground, the Commission concluded that the objectives of the 
rules were not of sporting nature only, but also to refrain competition and preserve the ISU’s 
economic interests
79
. With regards to the effects of the rules, the Commission determined that 
the ineligibility sanction prevented high level athletes from participating of competitions held 
by third parties and hence limited the “sources of supply” of potential new organisers – which 
generated an adverse effect on consumer choice and innovation potential. 
 
 Based on those arguments, the assessment of any non-sport case would have been 
concluded by then, with the violation to EU Competition Law being immediately declared. 
However, due to specificity of sport, the Commission settled the additional aspects which 
needed to be examined in order to substantiate any conclusion: 
 
The Eligibility rules relate to the organisation of competitive sport. In Meca-
Medina, the Court of Justice ruled that such rules are generally subject to EU 
competition law. They may fall outside the application of Article 101 TFEU in 
certain circumstances, taking into account (i) the overall context in which the rules 
were taken or produce their effects and notably their objectives, (ii) whether the 
consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of the 




 In other words, the Commission executed the test created in Meca-Medina and ratified 
in Bernard – also applied by CAS in RFC Seraing. The case-by-case analysis established by 
the CJEU thus extrapolated the court’s competence and was consolidated by the Commission 
as the “golden rule” to solve any tensions between EU Law and Lex Sportiva. 
 
 The application of the test in ISU resulted in the disapproval of the eligibility rules 
provided by the IF: the Commission did not consider the protection of economic interests as a 
legitimate objective, and the effects of the eligibility rules were found to be neither inherent 
                                                 
78
 Rule 102(1) a) (ii) of the ISU General Regulations 2014 
79
 The quoted rule was later altered in 2016 version of the ISU General Regulations, but the Commission 
considered that it still comprised an illegitimate object of restricting competition.  
80




nor proportionate to achieve those objectives – so that, even if there was not a financial 
objective, the rules would not be valid under EU Law. 
 
 At first sight, the grounds in which the Commission based its decision do not suggest 
any greater impact by EU Law on Lex Sportiva; it strictly followed the reasoning 
implemented in Meca-Medina and Bernard, and imposed changes exclusively on ISU 
regulations
81
.  Nonetheless, the importance of this ruling derives from the nature of eligibility 
rules. This kind of sporting rule is extremely comprehensive
82
, as most IFs and even the 
Olympic Charter contain eligibility rules (whose importance is highlighted, for example, by 
the fact that for almost a century those norms prevented professional athletes from competing 
in the Olympic Games). But more importantly, those rules represent the power emanating 
from the IFs in the sport pyramidal system. 
 
 The pyramidal system works on a monopolist basis, which can be explained by the 
roots of organised sport: groups of athletes founded clubs; these clubs constituted a national 
federation to organize national competitions between them; different national federations 
associated themselves to create an IF; and finally, the IOC recognised one IF responsible for 
each sport (or group of sports). Therefore, from the IOC to the athletes (going through IFs, 
national federations and clubs, besides continental associations, leagues, etc.), a monopolist 
chain of sports bodies – following the Ein-Platz-Prinzip
83
 – is constituted, and in principle it 
is not possible for any of the parties involved to participate of events outside this pyramid. 
Rules similar to the ones enacted by the ISU are fundamental to preserve such monopoly and 
are part of a vicious circle in this regard. 
 
 On one side, those rules generally preclude athletes and clubs from participating of 
unauthorised events (in the meaning of “events which are not authorised by the IF or one of 
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its affiliated”). This prohibition thus enhances the IF’s monopoly once it avoids competition 
for the organisation of the respective sport – since potential alternative organisers cannot 
attract the most traditional clubs and players, who are locked into the IF’s chain. 
 
 On the other side, it is exactly the power conferred by such monopoly that ensures 
enforceability of those restrictive eligibility rules: as the IF does not have competitors in the 
market, clubs and athletes have no choice but to stick with the IF’s system. Therefore, the 
monopoly is simultaneously the cause and the consequence of those eligibility rules, and vice 
versa. 
 
 This analysis raises the paradox involving the Ein-Platz-Prinzip and its foundation on 
the clubs’ and athletes’ free will to adhere to the pyramidal system managed by the respective 
IF. On one side, the monopoly derives from the practice, as clubs and athletes voluntarily 
decide to opt in such system; however, on the other side, it is the usual absence of an 
alternative organiser that induces athletes and clubs to submit themselves to the IF rules.  
 
 Based on this finding, the Commission decision may prove to be more than a mere 
continuation of previous CJEU jurisprudence. Whilst the ruling expressly preserves the 
specificity of sport by following Meca-Medina and Bernard, it points to the mitigation of 
another Lex Sportiva pillar: the pyramidal system, which “operates to reinforce the 
commercial power and income generation of the governing bodies”
84
; but once monopoly is 
broken, the whole group of norms enacted by the governing bodies have their efficacy and 
enforceability at risk, as their affiliated become able to opt out from that system and migrate 
to another one. In other words, the contractual legal order
85
 that sets the pyramid becomes 
vulnerable. 
 
 Finally, the ISU case may also become a cornerstone from an institutional perspective, 
by signalling a possible new attitude by the Commission. This expectation derives from the 
fact that “the Commission tends not to intervene in cases dealing with regulatory and 
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organizational aspects of sport”
86
 – which was indeed confirmed in the TPO case, as above 
mentioned. As a consequence, the Commission’s different willingness expressed on its ISU 
decision may indicate the beginning of a new stage on its approach to Lex Sportiva, possibly 
marked by higher activity and more severe application of EU Law. 
 
3.4 Corporate Governance Crisis 
 
 The professionalization of sport practice in the last decades has vastly changed the 
way sport organisations are managed. Since business has become a key aspect of high level 
sport, the management of clubs and federations has been requiring increasing level of 
professionalism. Moreover, the search for financing mechanisms led to major modifications 
regarding the legal nature of several clubs. 
 
 Nowadays, numerous clubs are legally established as companies, either by legal 
obligation
87
 or by choice in order to enhance external investment. Football has become a 
fertile land for mergers and acquisitions, with investors taking control of clubs (from the 
smallest to the most traditional ones) and conglomerates being formed. 
 
 Although these examples are intimately related to football, the approximation to 
Corporate Law is a tendency followed by all sports as a consequence of sport development as 
a business. Consequently, Sports Law has welcomed Corporate Law principles and concepts 
in order to deal with the current reality. In this regard, it is expected from sports bodies that 
they be managed in accordance with the best corporate governance practices. 
 
 The first registers about corporate governance as a specific Corporate Law matter 
arose in the 1970s, in the United States
88
. Initially, its regulation by the state was surrounded 
by large controversy as some understood that would represent inadequate public intervention 
on private matters. Despite that, corporate governance still developed academically, aiming to 
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mitigate the greatest challenges posed by the modern corporations
89
. By providing solutions 
to these issues, corporate governance surpassed the initial discussions about the convenience 
of state regulation regarding a private subject: the state interest in protecting national 
economy and ensuring capital market integrity prevailed. 
 
 When it comes to sport, the discussion is different: the autonomy of governing bodies 
is one of the pillars of Lex Sportiva, which assumes a transnational character as a result of 
being a de-territorialized legal system. Therefore, the debates about corporate governance in 
sport organisations do not refer to state interference in private matters, but generally to the 
possibility of external intervention in sports bodies’ autonomy. 
 
 Another difference is that corporate governance is a relatively new issue regarding 
sport – or at least a subject that did not develop significantly until few years ago. The IOC, for 
example, presented the first debates about the subject only in 2008 (nearly ten years after the 
first reports of corruption in the election of Olympic Games host city
90
), when the “Basic 
Universal Principles of Good Governance”
91
 were approved. More recently, the Olympic 
Agenda 2020
92
 ratified the recommendation that the stakeholders of the Olympic Movement 
were supposed to comply with the good governance principles provided by the document 
issued in 2008. 
 
 Although these measures indicate the IOC efforts in establishing good governance 
guidelines, their efficacy is highly questionable. The documents through which the IOC chose 
to promote governance lack greater representativeness and enforceability, as they are not seen 
by the Olympic Movement as binding rules and the IOC does not make any action in order to 
enforce them in practice. If these rules were inserted in the Olympic Charter – which is duly 
recognised as a binding statute
93
 –, they could be much more effective in promoting better 
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governance practices in sports organisations; however, they do not currently have this status, 
and consequently figure as mere general and abstract values which have not generated the 
expected practical effects yet. 
 
 This example involving the IOC reflects a great challenge to Lex Sportiva: the 
enforceability of corporate governance rules. The sport system does not provide incentives for 
the IFs managers to improve governance and transparency, as they are not sanctioned by not 
complying with those principles; moreover, better governance rules may make it more 
difficult and expensive to manage the entity; and finally, the creation of better and more 
transparent rules of governance may threaten the position of managers who are theoretically 
responsible for their implementation. 
 
 Furthermore, it is important to distinguish the theoretical and the practical terms. The 
statutory provision of better corporate governance systems do not necessary mean that their 
implementation will be satisfactory. FIFA recently provided a very good example of this 
difference by approving new rules on good governance but failing to make them effective, as 
reported by its governance committee ex-members: 
 
We have concluded that FIFA cannot reform from within. Those responsible for 
leading such reform are politically dependent on the associations and officials they 
need to reform, and may remove members of the judicial and supervisory 
independent committees at a whim. 
(…) 
What can be done? We advocate decisive external action. Parliamentary inquiries 
are good starting points, but it is necessary for them to produce concrete results. No 
country on its own – including Switzerland which hosts many of the world 
governing bodies – has the effective power to regulate such transnational 
organisations. The European Union is, though, in a privileged position: it brings 
together 28 member states – while the UK is still a member – which, collectively, 




 This joint statement exposes the sport corporate governance crisis currently in course. 
Several corruption scandals have arisen, involving different sports
95
, and Lex Sportiva has 
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proven to be ineffective to mitigate them so far. Self-regulation has been failing to ensure 
minimum level of transparency in sports governance
96
, and external intervention has been 
increasingly demanded – with the current model of sport autonomy, well described by 
Chappelet
97
, being put at stake
98
. Pielke Jr summarised the problem: 
 
Recent decades have seen greater attention being devoted to achieving best 
practices of governance on the part of states, businesses and non-profits, but sport 
organisations have lagged behind. They will continue to face pressures to improve 
their governance. Athletes, sponsors, supporters, governments and other parties all 
have interests in participating in this process. To date, however, progress has been 
slow. If sport organisations prove incapable of introducing effective reform, they 





 As proposed by Maduro, Pillay and Weiler, EU institutions could play an important 
role in externally promoting better governance in IFs – a suggestion that confirms the idea 
exposed in Chapter 2, in which the transnational effects of EU Law were mentioned as key for 
its impact on Lex Sportiva. Their statement seems correct as the current IOC and IFs context 
does not indicate any effective development on sports corporate governance; however, EU has 
already assessed this subject, and pointed to a different direction. 
 
 In 2013, an EU Expert Group on Good Governance, established after the Council 
Resolution on an EU Work Plan for Sport 2011-2014, issued the “Principles of good 
governance in sport”
100
. Regarding the implementation of those principles, the document 
provided the following: 
 
(…) it is important that good governance principles are embraced voluntarily by 
sports bodies in the wider interest of promoting effective sporting regulation and 
development. Enforcement by national governments or European institutions via 
contract and/or funding conditions might have the potential to compromise the 
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autonomy of sports bodies and create tensions in the wider international sporting 
framework. 
Autonomous self-regulation by the sport movement remains the best option and is 
consistent with the structure of the international sport movement. All parties should 
have an interest in ensuring effective governance structures are in place as this is 
more likely to result in better sports policy and minimise disputes or challenges 
both from within a sport or outside. 
The role of the EU should consist in encouraging compliance with the agreed 
principles and rules. 
 
 This excerpt interestingly reveals the recognition of autonomy and self-regulation as 
fundamental grounds for a proper ruling on sport corporate governance. The initial measures 
suggested by the Expert Group to be taken by the EU were limited to (i) funding educational 
programs and (ii) monitoring and benchmarking activities, with other alternatives (such as 
conditionality of funding subject to respect of the principles) being held for a second moment, 
just in case “the application of good governance principles is considered as being not 
satisfactory”. Thereby, the Expert Group clearly rejected the idea of a direct and effective 
intervention through creation of binding rules to be complied with by sports bodies. 
 
 Later on, the Commission launched a “Declaration for sport federations and 
organisations in the EU”
101
, signed by more than forty national or European sports bodies by 
June 2018. The Declaration basically recognises the importance of good governance for 
integrity and reputation of sport, and then comprises a voluntary commitment by the 
signatories to “implement the basic principles of Good Governance in Sport – Integrity, 
Accountability, Transparency, Democracy, Participation and Inclusivity”. Once again, the 
Commission’s action is limited to a non-binding document, which provides mere generic 
principles instead of effectively impacting the improvement of sport governance. 
 
 The Commission seems to be conditioned by the specific nature of sport, provided by 
Article 165(1) of the TFEU; therefore, it probably understands that any external rules 
regarding sports bodies’ governance would violate their autonomy and, naturally, such 
specificity. This reasoning is just partially correct: sport autonomy indeed must be preserved 
once Lex Sportiva is recognised as a proper legal system which derives from specificity of 
sport; notwithstanding, that autonomy is neither unlimited nor immune to possible 
interactions with other legal systems. 
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 Therefore, eventual measures adopted by any EU institution to enhance corporate 
governance in sports bodies shall not be seen as an improper threat to their autonomy. On the 
contrary, they may constitute a necessary intervention to preserve sport, as a mere 
consequence of the permanent interaction between the two legal systems: EU Law and Lex 
Sportiva. 
 
 Moreover, the TFEU itself provides the grounds for such initiative. Article 165(2) 
determines that EU action shall aim at “developing the European dimension in sport, by 
promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions (…)”. The lack of transparency in 
governing bodies’ management represents a real threat to these values, as sport integrity and 
IFs’ reliability are put at stake. The numerous scandals involving sport governance create a 
negative effect to sport, which turns to be associated to corruption and other illegal practices – 
the opposite to the fairness and openness intended in the Treaty. 
 
 This is why the EU may take appropriate initiatives in order to promote better 
corporate governance in IFs. It is true that there still are other alternatives which may provide 
the necessary regulations and incentives for sports bodies to effectively enhance their 
corporate governance levels without any EU interference – the Sport Integrity Global Alliance 
(SIGA)
102
 is a good example. Nevertheless, EU’s legitimacy to act on this subject is clear and 
justifiable as well: just as the CJEU has always weighed the specificity of sport and EU Law, 
the Commission (as well as other EU institutions) can perfectly ponder whether the promotion 
of fairness and openness in sporting competitions is in danger due to the poor governance 
verified in several sport bodies. The result of such analysis will probably indicate the best 
available solution that EU Law can provide for this long sport corporate governance crisis. 
 
 Once again, it is vital to mention that we do not hereby suggest that the autonomy of 
sports bodies or the specificity of sport be refused; but if the sport bodies are not capable to 
self-regulate through Lex Sportiva, the interaction with EU legal system may become 
unavoidable – an the presence of an external player enforcing effective measures to establish 
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good governance may be key for the maintenance of sport core values (mainly its integrity). 
In this regard, we agree with Weatherill: 
 
EC law is not constitutionally capable of being used to devise detailed anti-doping 
procedures or to fix the sum that is due to a club releasing a player for international 
duty or to stipulate general or detailed rules requiring participation in sports 
governance by actors currently excluded from the business of organising 
international football tournaments. Nor indeed do the EU’s institutions possess the 
technical expertise required to engage in such detailed shaping of sports 
governance. Nevertheless by treating particular features of sports governance as 
incompatible with the demands of the Treaty, EC law is plainly capable of steering 




4 CONCLUSION: TRENDS OF EVOLUTION 
 
 Despite relatively recent, the evolution of the interaction between EU Law and Lex 
Sportiva has been exceptional so far. The numerous sport-related cases brought before EU 
institutions clearly demonstrate that EU Law has been playing a vital role in the development 
of sport normativity. 
 
 The cases, norms and documents assessed throughout this thesis revealed that such 
evolution has been really surprising at some points. Meca-Medina is the greatest example: 
when its decision was issued, sport community was sure that “purely sporting rules” were 
away from EU Law’s purview, and could not see that change of paradigm coming. 
 
 Meca-Medina also illustrates how the EU institutions are occasionally inconsistent on 
their rulings. Mestre
104
 put light on the fact that the decisions issued by the Commission, the 
European Court of First Instance and the CJEU on the case were contradictory between 
themselves, and pointed that the CJEU judgment “seeks to innovate, by adopting an approach 
contrary to the preceding case-law, but at the same time defending the case-law which it seeks 
to overturn”. Furthermore, after also assessing the White Paper on Sport, he concluded that 
the EU institutions were consistently contradictory when applying EU Law to sport: 
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(…) there appears to be no doubt that, as yet, no minimally coherent case law and 
decision making practice has been developed. The impression gained is that of an 
ad hoc or casuistic approach, with no pragmatic and scientific criteria, which 
obviously results in divergent solutions contrary to the principle of the uniformity 
of EU law. 
Unless a new route is followed, we will keep on having a “never ending story” of 
contradictions, which jeopardises both the “specificity of sport” and the European 
integration process (through sport). 
 
 The final part of Mestre’s statement reveals the most worrying aspect of those EU 
contradictions: they may directly affect Lex Sportiva. Consequently, a more straightforward 
approach is demanded so as to ensure not only the “uniformity of EU Law”, but also the 
stability of sport normativity. 
 
 It is true that after Meca-Medina, no equivalent turnaround has occurred. Even the 
most surprising decisions since then (i.e. the ISU ruling) have always followed the reasoning 
created by the CJEU at that time (with the significant contribution of the White Paper on 
Sport to consolidate it) – which has been used by CAS as well, as we could notice concerning 
TPO. 
 
 Still, contradictory attitudes keep occurring. It is hard to understand, for example, why 
the Commission deeply examined the complaint against ISU’s eligibility rules but, on the 
other side, refused to even start proceedings regarding TPO ban. This continuous 
unexpectedness can be partially explained by the nature of Law as a social science, directly 
influenced by volatile social, economic and (mostly) political factors. Therefore, it is very 
difficult to predict the future of the EU Law and Lex Sportiva interaction – as Meca-Medina 
once proved. 
 
  Despite that, the analysis of the historical progress of that interaction, combined with 
the assessment of the most important issues that currently involve the subject, allows us to 
identify interesting trends of such evolution. 
 
 Firstly, the latest cases have signalled changes on the balance among EU institutions 
and their level of action. Whilst in the 1
st
 stage of interaction the CJEU largely dominated 
EU’s interference on sport, from the White Paper on Sport on we have seen the Commission’s 




has not been as straightforward as it would be desirable; notwithstanding, the Commission’s 
decision in ISU points to a new role that it may play from now on. 
 
 Besides the institutional balance perspective, the confirmation of this trend may also 
be welcome with regards to the Commission’s approach to sport-related matters: it used to 
follow a predominantly political strategy to deal with sport bodies, either celebrating non-
binding agreements or launching declarations to be voluntarily signed by those sport 
organisations who wish so. 
 
 The latter strategy was already mentioned in section 3.4, and has not been effective in 
order to promote better governance in practice yet. On its turn, the policy of signing non-
binding agreements can be illustrated by consecutive Arrangements for Cooperation 
concluded between UEFA and the Commission, in order to achieve common objectives 
shared by the parties, such as “(a) promote values and principles common in Europe”, “(b) 
strengthen cooperation in matters of long-term interest to football and sport in Europe, such as 





 We do not deny the importance of this approach by the Commission: as above 
referred, the political aspect is fundamental to construe law in a broader sense, and the 
complex rules-changing process occurred throughout Bosman confirms it. Moreover, it often 
results in significant pieces of soft law – which have already proved to impact the interaction 
between EU Law and Lex Sportiva. 
 
 Nonetheless, that strategy has not been enough to manage some key issues, as 
demonstrated especially regarding corporate governance. Therefore, the Commission’s 
decision in ISU is encouraging, since it indicates its inclination to tackle important issues 
more assertively while still observing the specific nature of sport. 
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 Finally, besides the institutional and strategical aspects, another substantial trend must 
be observed: the continuous expansion of the interaction between EU Law and Lex Sportiva. 
This trend has been consolidating since the 2
nd
 stage of evolution, and the comparison 
between the first and the latest cases hereby mentioned leaves no room for doubts: when the 
CJEU issued its decision in Walrave, nobody could expect that the Commission would ever 
declare the invalidity of eligibility rules issued by an IF, as it did in ISU. 
 
 In between these two cases, the applicable law (including all its sources) was severely 
modified: the CJEU jurisprudence changed, the White Paper on Sport was published, and 
sport was finally raised to Treaty status. During all these decades, though, the specificity of 
sport remained intact – and Lex Sportiva’s status as a legal system too. Despite that, the 
solutions provided by EU institutions to deal with such specificity vastly changed, and the 
interaction between EU Law and Lex Sportiva significantly broadened, with sporting rules 
that in the past would not be affected by EU Law becoming subject to it. 
 
 In the introduction to this thesis, we referred to the image of two secant circles as a 
good description of the relation between EU Law and Lex Sportiva. The expansion of their 
interaction during the last decades can thus be translated into a substantial growth of the 
intersection area between those circles, to a point in which the intersection currently 
represents almost the entire circle corresponding to Lex Sportiva.  If this trend continues 
evolving, in the future we may reach the limit of the theory of the secant circles, with just a 
minimal part of Lex Sportiva not interacting with EU Law: the so-called “rules of the game”.  
 
 The sport bodies would certainly consider this possibility as a heavy loss at first sight, 
because their rules would continue to be increasingly subject to EU Law (as they did after 
Meca-Medina). Nevertheless, once specificity of sport is preserved, the interaction between 
EU Law and Lex Sportiva has been presenting positive results to protect key principles 
enshrined by both legal systems, i.e. the integrity, fairness and openness of sport. Therefore, 
we really hope this trend can be confirmed and this interaction continues to expand: in our 
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